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I.

Nature Of The Case.

A.

This case
Carter,

his

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

is

the second lawsuit ﬁled

and Scott Carter,

by

Inc.

and Gateway Parks,

from Carter’s investment 0f $200,000

in

Gateway

LLC

(“Gateway Parks”). Both

J.

Industries, Inc.

suits

In the ﬁrst lawsuit, Carter

Parks.

claimed that his investment was actually a loan to be repaid with

Ryan Neptune and Neptune

Amelia

dba Carter Dental (collectively “Carter”) against Ryan Neptune and

Inc.

companies Neptune Industries,

arise

Plaintiffs/Appellants Scott R. Carter,

interest.

He

also alleged that

had been unjustly enriched because some of Carter’s

investment had been used for certain personal and business expenses that Carter alleged were
improper.

The
Dental

OC

v.

ﬁrst lawsuit

is

Scott R. Carter, Amelia

Ryan Neptune and Neptune

1503299 (“the First Lawsuit”).

district court

When

and

That case was decided

dba Carter

Scott Carter, Inc.

Industries, Ina, Idaho Fourth District Court

after a

that Carter’s

money was

Case N0.

5-day bench

in fact invested in

challenged by Carter, the court further held that

were properly accounted
Parks.

Carter,

trial.

CV
The

entered detailed ﬁndings of fact and conclusions 0f law, as well as detailed rulings

on motions. The court held
not a loan.

J.

for

all

and were spent on expenses relating

Gateway Parks and was

of the funds Carter invested
to the startup

See Findings 0f Fact and Conclusions 0f Law (“FOF/COL”) in

Record (“CR”)

at

68-84; and

Final Judgment and

t0

Mem. Decision and Order 0n

Disallow Fees and Costs in

First Lawsuit, Clerk’s

Plaintzﬂ’s Motions t0 Alter 0r

First Lawsuit,

CR at

120-21.

appeal any 0f the ﬁndings 0f fact or conclusions of law in the First Lawsuit.

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

- 1

0f Gateway

Carter

Amend

m

The lawsuit now on appeal before

the

Supreme Court

is

the

“Second Lawsuit.” In

second case, Carter contends that Ryan Neptune and Gateway Parks committed

this

common law

fraud in the inducement and general fraud under the Idaho Uniform Securities Act 0f 2004 (LC.

§

30-14-509G)(2)) in accepting Carter’s investment in Gateway Parks.

the

same expenses he did

were used

t0

in the First Lawsuit, again claiming that

some of his investment funds

pay personal expenses 0f Ryan Neptune and business expenses not related

He

0f Gateway Parks.

startup

Carter again challenges

also

makes

the

same

to the

factual allegations, including his claim of

having n0 knowledge 0f how his investment was used by Ryan Neptune and Gateway Parks until

May of 2016.

These claims were fully heard and

rej ected

by

Summary Of Grounds For Denial Of Appeal.

B.

The

District

Court in

this

Second Lawsuit granted summary judgment

Gateway Parks 0n

the grounds that the case

Second Lawsuit

barred by res judicata, and Carter cannot

at

the court in the First Lawsuit.

is

is

in favor

of

barred by the applicable statutes of limitation, the

show

all

nine elements of fraud.

725-733 (Mem. Decision and 0rd. 0n Mot. for Summary Judgment) (ﬁled June

This appeal should be denied and the grant 0f

CR

11, 2019).

summary judgment afﬁrmed on any of

the

following grounds.

1.

The

Statute 0f Limitations.
district court

granted

summary judgment

in favor

0f Gateway Parks on the grounds

that this

Second Lawsuit

had

access to and actual knowledge of all of the ﬁnancial transactions and bank statements 0f

full

Ryan Neptune

is

barred by the applicable statutes of limitation. Id. at 726-728. Carter

personally, and

March of 2013. Thus,

this

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

-

Neptune

Industries, Inc.

Second Lawsuit ﬁled

2

in

May

and Gateway Parks
of 2018

is

LLC

clearly barred

beginning in

by

the three-

year statute 0f limitation for fraud in the inducement, I.C. § 5-218(4), and the two-year statute 0f
limitation for fraud under the Idaho

Uniform

Securities

I.C. §

30-14-509G)(2).

Res Judicata.

2.

Carter’s claims in the present case are barred

court

Act of 2004,

trial

and court decisions

in the First Lawsuit.

by

The

the First Lawsuit.

The

issues

and claims

in this case

the First Lawsuit.

The

issues

and claims

arise

the doctrine 0f res judicata

Plaintiffs-Appellants

were

by

the prior

all parties t0

were heard and decided against Carter

from the same

set

0f operative

in

facts as the First

Lawsuit: Carter’s investment of funds in Gateway Parks.

Show

Carter Cannot

3.

Carter cannot establish
“falsity,” “justiﬁable reliance,”

the Required Elements 0f Fraud.

all

nine elements of his fraud claims, speciﬁcally the elements of

and “resultant injury.” His claim of “falsity”

(that

Ryan Neptune

misrepresented the purposes for Which Carter’s investment would be spent) has already been
litigated to

ﬁnal conclusion against Carter.

Carter also cannot

full

show

“justiﬁable reliance”

for.

0n the alleged misrepresentation because he had

access t0 and actual knowledge of all ﬁnancial records of Ryan Neptune, Neptune Industries,

Gateway

Parks, and Lansing Superparks beginning

Carter cannot

show “damages.”

owner; Gateway Parks

is

percentage of ownership

4.

The
LC.

A11 funds were properly spent and accounted

The

is

§ 12-120(3).

Carter

invested $200,000 in

an operating business; Carter

is

Award

his investment.

Gateway Parks

part

of Attorney Fees t0

awarded attorney fees and costs

to

become

Lastly,

a part

owner of the company; and

his

to

Gateway Parks Was Proper.

Gateway Parks under I.R.C.P 54 and

See Supplemental Clerk’s Record (“Supp.CR”

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

made

based on the amount of his investment.

District Court’s

district court

He

m

-

3

at

55-60) (Mem. Decision and

0rd. 0n Mot. t0 Disallow Costs

and Attorney

because the gravamen of the lawsuit

Gateway Parks

is

Fees).

The award 0f attorney

for

May

11,

Gateway Parks on October
31,

2019 (CR

at

14, 2018.

CR at

summary judgment on March

a hearing 0n the motion 0n April 25, 2019.

Gateway Parks 0n June

2019.

in

that a

§ 12-120(3).

And Disposition.

Carter ﬁled his Second Lawsuit on

Gateway Parks ﬁled a motion

money

Under established Idaho law, claiming

for purposes 0f ﬁnancial gain.

Course Of The Proceedings

was proper

the commercial transaction of Carter investing

commercial transaction was fraudulent does not remove the case from
C.

fees

CR

10, 2019.

at

8-12 (ﬁle-stamped Complaint).

21, 2019.

The

district court

The court granted summary judgment

held

in favor

of

725-733. The court granted attorney fees and costs t0

Supp.CR

at

55-60.

Carter ﬁled a notice 0f appeal 0n July

813-19) and an amended notice of appeal 0n October 21, 2019 (Supp.CR

at

63-

72).

D.

Statement 0f Facts.
1.

Introduction.

This

Neptune

is

the

Second Lawsuit ﬁled by Carter against Ryan Neptune and

Industries, Inc.

and Gateway Parks,

was not formally a party
Second Lawsuit and
Lawsuit. This

is

all

LLC

of Gateway Parks’ actions

0f the matters Carter complains 0f here were squarely
the transcript of the 5-day court

was discussed 0r mentioned over 500

times.

Gateway Parks was

CR

written decisions of the court in the First Lawsuit.

See

even though Ryan Neptune and Neptune Industries,

Inc. are

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

-

4

companies

(“Gateway Parks”). Although Gateway Parks

t0 the First Lawsuit, all

shown throughout

his

at

trial in

at issue in this

at issue in the First

which Gateway Parks

also a primary subject in the

68-84; and 120-121.

Moreover,

not formally parties to this Second

Lawsuit, the actions complained of in this case were actions by
Industries, Inc. (wholly

owned by Ryan Neptune).

Ryan Neptune and Neptune

In addition, the primary

bank account

statements referred t0 in the Complaint in this Second Lawsuit were the checking account
statements ofNeptune Industries, Inc. See

CR at 9, ﬂ 7

(Complaint, at

In the First Lawsuit, Carter claimed that his investment in

not an investment.

He

also alleged that

improperly. After a bench

trial,

some of

2,

1]

Gateway Parks was a loan and

his investment

money had been

the court in that case ruled against Carter

present case, Carter again alleges that

7).

Ryan Neptune wrongfully

spent

on both claims. In the

spent funds 0n personal

expenses and business expenses not related to the startup 0f Gateway Parks.
It is

crucial to note that the

The court

issue in the First Lawsuit.

and

all

same expenses complained of
in that case

for.

See FOF/COL,

are relevant portions of the court’s Findings

the First Lawsuit.

CR

at

68-84.

were squarely

at

found that none 0f the expenses were improper

of Carter’s funds were properly accounted

Below

in this case

CR at 82, ﬂ C.

ofFact and Conclusions ofLaw from

Carter did not appeal the Findings ofFact

and Conclusions 0f

Law.
2.

Relevant Findings 0f Fact from the First Lawsuit.

Scott Carter and

junior high.

Ryan Neptune (“Neptune”) were

Neptune was a renowned snowboarder.

friends

Who had known

He was

each other since

in the business

of operating

snowboard/ski terrain parks and fabricating the associated equipment for the parks through his

Wholly owned company, Neptune Industries,
Carter Dental.

Inc.

Carter and Neptune reside in the

CRat69,111.

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF
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5

Carter, a dentist,

same neighborhood

owns

Scott Carter, Inc., dba

in Boise, Idaho.

FOF/COL,

In early 2013,

Neptune operated a

Hawk Island. Neptune had begun to

terrain

snow park near Lansing, Michigan, known

as

discuss With major people in the snowboard/ski industry the

concept 0f building small snow terrain parks Within large populated city limits, bringing those

FOF/COL,

recreational facilities closer to consumers.

CR at 69, ﬂ 2.

Beginning in March 2013, Neptune began discussing his plans With Carter.
frequently

communicated through email,

text messages,

and

in person.

was developing a business plan and pro forma, projecting out multiple
years.

T0 expand

this idea t0 multiple locations,

outside sources, something he had not done before.

Neptune would need

FOF/COL,

At

that time,

They

Neptune

locations over several

t0 obtain capital

from

CR at 69-70, ﬂ 3.

Contrary to Carter’s assertion in the current complaint, the court in the First Lawsuit

found that Carter, not Neptune, was the ﬁrst
concept for snow parks.

On March

t0

propose that Carter would invest in Neptune’s

26, 2013, Carter texted Neptune:

you need an investor?” The same day, Neptune responded, Via

“I highly

doubt

it,

but d0

text:

“We need investors for sure Have tons and tons and tons looking t0 help but I
am horrible at asking for help
You would have to come over and I could
show you Where I am at With everything Had more amazing thoughts and
ideas come t0 me over night the past few days and I am building a plan around
I’d have to give you a bigger picture Vision Ithink we have money
them
.

.

.

.

.

.

I want to d0
up But I Will never close options out
[Idaho] and as many places as possible t0 compliment winter use

lined

FOF/COL,

.

CR at 70,

11

the

umbrella

t0

of

.

this in

Eagle

.”
.

.

.

4.

In Neptune’s basement that evening, Carter and

and plan — namely,

.

form an

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

to operate

each snow park, and they would

yet-to-be-created

the

Defendant/Respondent in

LLC

this

-

6

Neptune talked about Neptune’s Vision

Second Lawsuit.

parent

company,

all

Gateway

operate under

Parks,

the

Because Gateway Parks had not yet been

formed,

it

capital for

did not have the ability t0 obtain bank ﬁnancing and, therefore, had to rely on investor

needed funds. Carter asked Neptune

to

“keep him in the 100p” about Neptune’s plans,

FOF/COL,

including his plans concerning the formation 0f Gateway Parks.

Neptune formed the ﬁrst two snow park LLCs
Superparks

LLC

LLC

0n March 25 and Eagle Superparks,

26, Carter sent a text to

Neptune reasserting

be interested in looking
pockets (millions) but

at

I

it.

think

you

in late

on

we d0 have some money

t0

that

“I

I

would

don’t have the deepest

are trying to invest.”

The two met

that

FOF/COL,

CR

6.

ﬂ

On March

27, 2013, the day after meeting With

company, Carter texted Neptune:

“My

if

you

are interested.”

it

would help you grow

Neptune asked

for

worksheet before accepting any funds. FOF/COL,

During

this

time,

Neptune about plans

thinking from an investment standpoint

help get you one more Gateway Parks park

know

Rockford

Gateway Parks:

afternoon at Neptune’s house and reviewed the business plan for Gateway Parks.

at 70,

4.

0n March 26. Once again, 0n March

something big.

we

11

March 0f 2013:

his interest in investing in

are

CR at 70,

more time

CR at 71,

11

faster

for the

was

with less

to project costs

if I

risk.

new
could

Let

me

and work 0n the

8.

Neptune shared a Dropbox folder with Carter through which he

provided a substantial amount of information about the soon-to-be formed Gateway Parks and
the individual entities operating

returns,

company

snow

parks.

Neptune included

his personal ﬁnancials, tax

data, insurance information, receipts, checking account registers,

agreements, operating agreements and other documents.

base that could be accessed from any location.

Dropbox. FOF/COL,

CR at 71,
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1]

8.

Carter

He

utilized

Dropbox

investor

as a central ﬁling

Neptune regularly updated documents 0n

was given access

to

Dropbox on April

2,

2013, more

than two months before he ﬁrst invested in the company.
in

Supp. 0f Mot. for

regularly did, he

Summary Judgment).

Any

CR at 60-61,

1]

9

(A19?

ofRyan Neptune

time Carter logged onto Dropbox, which he

would have received notiﬁcation 0f updates

that

had been made. FOF/COL,

CR at 71, ﬂ 8.
As 0f May
Gateway

14,

2013, Neptune informed Carter 0f his efforts t0 raise up t0 $6 million for

Parks. Carter responded he

“That’s good news.

had up

6 mil

investor] has the pocket to

.

.

d0

.

to

$200,000 t0

Wow

it, I

that’s a lot.

CR at 71-72,

1]

new

sites

in

like

he [another

Small potatoes.

What your Vision

as well as you.

11.

Neptune told Carter
potential

Sounds

only have up t0 200,000.

Keep me posted, I am very much conﬁdent
Keep me posted.”

FOF/COL,

invest, stating:

in

May

of 2013 that he needed funds for due diligence/travel t0 see

and legal expenses for the startup company.

FOF/COL,

CR

at 72,

1]

(These are some of the expenses Carter complained about in the First Lawsuit and

complains about again in

this suit).

that time). Carter later texted that

On

(As just shown, Carter had

full

13.

now

knowledge 0f the expenses

he could have $100,000 to Neptune that week.

Id. 72,

1]

at

14.

June 10 and June 12, 2013, Carter issued checks to Ryan Neptune in the amounts 0f

$30,000 and $70,000, respectively. Because Gateway Parks was not yetformed, thefunds were
deposited into Neptune Industries, Inc.
legalfees

’s

bank account.

and other associated expenses for

the start—up

The funds were used by Neptune for
company. FOF/COL,

CR

at 73,

ﬂ

18.

Again, Carter complained about these expenses in the First Lawsuit, and tried to recover the

expenses under a theory of unjust enrichment.
claiming he did not

know

about them, which

induced into investing in Gateway Parks.
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is

Now, he

is

attacking these

patently false, and he

was

same expenses,

therefore fraudulently

Neptune constantly kept Carter and the other investors updated 0n the status 0f Gateway
Parks through emails regarding

its

downloaded the transactions from
Superparks,

Industries,

Rockford

and through Dropbox. He

business andﬁnancials

all the business accounts, including

Lansing

Superparks,

Superparks,

Gateway Parks, Eagle

Snowtools,

Planet

regularly

and Neptune

and made them available on Dropbox. Neptune also provided Carter With substantial

information about Gateway Parks Via

text.

When Neptune

with the company, Carter responded enthusiastically.
Carter maintained at

trial that

advised

FOF/COL,

him 0f new developments

CR 74,

1]

20.

he did not object t0 Neptune’s reference t0 him as an

“investor” in the various business documents because he could never access the spreadsheets in

Dropbox, where Neptune posted them

t0

keep the investors up

to date.

The court

in the First

Lawsuit did not believe Carter’s claim about not accessing Dropbox:
This

Court does not

ﬁnd

Carter credible.

In April 0f 2013, Neptune

how to access tabs 0n spreadsheets using
Google Docs and how to use Google Docs on his phone. Indeed, such
instructions would be readily available through an internet search had Carter
truly been unable to ﬁgure out how t0 use the program. More importantly, the
documentary evidence — namely, Carter’s own communications — reveals that
Carter regularly reviewed the documents that Neptune provided.”

speciﬁcally instructed Carter

FOF/COL,

On

CR at 74, FN 3

(emphasis added).

July 23, 2013, Carter inquired with Neptune Whether he had ﬁnished the

Parks company spreadsheet.

some ﬁnancial
wanted

Neptune agreed

startup needs for the

t0 invest

more but

I

Will

t0

forward

company. Neptune
need

it.”

He

it

to

stated:

be able to do 25k without

much problem.” FOF/COL, CR

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF
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-

him and then informed him of

“Anyway

not sure if you even

explained he needed the

trademarks for Gateway Parks, insurance, and company-related

Gateway

travel.

at 74,

1]

money

t0 obtain

Carter replied: “I should

21.

(These are the same

expenses that Carter again complains about in
(Complaint, ﬁled

May

On August

1,

would ask
think.”

is if

if

3

1]

year,

I

would

get the ﬁrst shot at

9,

1]

7

it.

Let

and August 6 0f 2013, Carter issued checks

Gateway Parks was formed

was identiﬁed

I

me know What you

23.

because Gateway Parks had not yet been formed. FOF/COL,
as a limited liability

as the

majority owner of Gateway Parks.

On

at

“The only thing

capital development, stating:

t0

Neptune

$15,000, respectively, Which Neptune deposited into Neptune Industries, Inc.

Industries, Inc.

CR

Indeed, he asked Neptune that he be allowed t0 be

needed.

any additional rounds 0f

CR at 74-75,

On August

See

2013, Carter texted Neptune, stating that he would have additional funds t0

you need money next

FOF/COL,

Second Lawsuit).

14, 2018).

Neptune the following Tuesday,
the ﬁrst investor in

this

CR at 75,

1]

CR

’s

and

bank account —

24.

company on August

managing member (FOF/COL,

CR at 60,

1]

for $10,000

Neptune

21, 2013.

ﬂ 25), and

at 75,

is

the

3 (Neptune Aff.).

October 21, 2013 Neptune sent Carter the then-current version

(after

of the Investor Agreement as well as the Gateway Parks Operating Agreement.

many

He

revisions)

also provided

an update regarding the company’s actions and plans, keeping Carter fully informed about the

company. FOF/COL,
Exhibit

B

to the operating

capital contribution

B)

in addition to a

CR at 75, ﬂ 27.
agreement

listed Scott

and

0f $125,000 as of that time, with a .9262%

55% interest in Gateway Parks

Amy

Carter as having

interest in

made

a

Gateway Parks (Class

(Class C). Carter acknowledged receipt 0f the

October draft of the investment agreement and never expressed any confusion about the terms of
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his

agreement with Neptune, nor did he protest the applicability of the investment agreement t0

FOF/COL,

him.

An

CR at 75,

1]

27.

investor valuation meeting for

value of the shares was assigned.

brought up t0 speed on

all

Gateway Parks was held December

Carter

came

the agreements and

to

2013 and the

3,

Neptune’s house the same night and was

was happy —

his equity

had increased. FOF/COL,

CR at 76, ﬂ 29.
Gateway Parks

In January of 2014, Carter agreed t0 provide a short—term loan t0

$35,000 so the company could purchase the “Lazy J” property in Eagle.
Within 30 days,
investors.

When Gateway Parks

It

was

$35,000 loan into an additional capital contribution. FOF/COL,
in either the First

be repaid

received additional investment funds expected from other

However, Carter and Neptune agreed on or around January 29, 2014

has not alleged

to

for

0r Second Lawsuit that

this

CR

at 76,

1]

30.

to convert the

(Note:

$35,000 was misspent

in

Carter

any way).

Carter provided additional funds speciﬁcally in response to the company’s need for a

snow groomer. On January
Neptune
as

it

as

30, 2014, Carter Dental issued check

t0

Ryan

payee in the amount of $40,000. The check was not deposited into a bank account,

was negotiated

at

“Idaho Independent Bank” and used to purchase a cashier’s check and

sent directly to an equipment supplier for a

has not alleged

in either the First

questioned

snow groomer. FOF/COL,

0r Second Lawsuit that

Carter continued participating in

never

No. 2485 made out

Why he was

Gateway Parks

consistently

referred

correspondence concerning Gateway Parks matters.
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this

CR

at 76,

1]

$40,000 was misspent

31.

in

as an investor throughout

to

as

FOF/COL,

an

investor

CR at 76, ﬂ 32.

in

(Carter

any way).

2014 and

the

various

become nervous about

In April of 2014, Carter started to

Carter and Neptune

Carter explained that Hatcher

would be able

how to

t0 discuss

monies owed

had used $150,000 he acquired from

Earlier, Carter

Hatchet.

met twice

his personal ﬁnancial situation.

to Carter

by

his friend,

his mother—in—law to invest With

owed him roughly $800,000 and he

t0 recover the funds in order t0 reimburse his mother-in-law.

members

explain to other family

that the

Greg Hatcher.

money had been

lost.

Greg

did not think he

Carter didn’t

FOF/COL,

know

CR at 77-78,

11

33.

On August

1,

2014, Neptune and Carter met

mother—in—law was days away from dying.

at Carter’s

ofﬁce and discussed that Carter’s

Desperate because of his personal ﬁnancial tumult,

Carter began considering the idea of removing his

money from Gateway

Parks.

At

the meeting,

Carter did not raise the idea 0f a debt or loan being due at that time, but later that day texted

Ryan Neptune about wanting
Further, although Carter

t0 get “principal

and

interest,”

using those terms for the ﬁrst time.

had received an “investor signature packet”

for

Gateway Parks, which

included a ﬁnal Investment Agreement reﬂecting his investment (and not a loan), Carter did not
sign and return

FOF/COL,

it

as he

CR at 78,

1]

had elected

t0 seek return

of his money he was

asserting

was a

loan.

35.

In September of 2014, Carter continued his

interest

now

and asked Neptune

new demand

t0 agree to “collateralize the debt.”

for the return

of his “loan” plus

Neptune explained

that Carter’s

investment was collateralized by his part ownership in the company, and his best bet was t0
a buyer for his share 0f Gateway Parks.
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FOF/COL,

CR at 78,

1]

36.

ﬁnd

Carter persisted in his

demand

This led to the First Lawsuit ﬁled
claims in

that his investment

March

2,

be deemed a loan with

interest due.

2015, and the subsequent court decisions denying his

total.

3.

The Court

in the First

Lawsuit Repeatedly Found that Scott Carter

Was Not

Reliable 0r Credible.

At

the outset 0f

its

Findings 0f Fact and Conclusions 0f Law, the court in the First

Lawsuit declared that

The Court found Mr. Neptune’s testimony t0 generally be reliable and
credible. In contrast, Mr. Carter was not reliable, nor his testimony
credible.

FOF/COL,

CR at 69, FN

When

1.

Carter testiﬁed that he could not access Dropbox, the court pronounced that “This

Court does not ﬁnd Carter credible.” The Court pointed out that “Carter’s

—

reveals that Carter regularly reviewed the documents that

FOF/COL,

own communications

Neptune provided

[Via

Dropbox].”

CR at 74, FN 3.

Carter tried to

argue that his frequent references to the monies provided as an

“investment” was not indicative of his belief that they were, in

fact,

an investment. As held by

the court, Carter contended that “in the construct of his unique lexicon, the term ‘investment’

synonymous with the term

‘loan’

and he used the terms interchangeably.”

The court then

declared:

This Court does not ﬁnd this testimony t0 be credible.

experienced businessman

Who

Carter

is

an

has both loaned and invested money.

When he

loaned money, as he did with [sic] t0 Mr. Hatcher on several
occasions, he had Mr. Hatcher — also a close friend 0f his — execute

He did not request the same for Neptune.
promissory notes.
Regarding his agreement with Neptune, Carter acknowledged that he
was aware
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is

he was t0 receive a rate 0f return, Which would depend

in part

on the proﬁtability of Gateway Parks. This

is

consistent with

an understanding 0f an investment versus a loan. Further, the course
0f conduct preceding Carter’s sudden need for cash in the summer of

2014 was uniquely consistent with the understanding Carter was an
investor — not a creditor — 0f Gateway Parks.

FOF/COL,

CR at 78-79, ﬂ 38

Summary 0f Investments by Carter.

4.

Carter

1.

June

(emphasis added).

10,

made

the following investments in

2013: $30,000 check

made payable

Gateway
t0

Parks:

Ryan Neptune and deposited

in the checking

account 0f Neptune Industries, Inc. (Gateway Parks not yet formed)
2.

June

12,

2013: $70,000 check

made payable

t0

Ryan Neptune and deposited

in the checking

account 0f Neptune Industries, Inc. (Gateway Parks not yet formed)
3.

August

3,

2013:

$10,000 check made payable t0 Ryan Neptune and deposited in the

checking account 0f Neptune Industries, Inc. (Gateway Parks not yet formed)
4.

August

6,

2013:

$15,000 check made payable t0 Ryan Neptune and deposited in the

checking account 0f Neptune Industries, Inc. (Gateway Parks not yet formed)
5.

January 17, 2014: $35,000 check

made payable

directly to Title

One

to help

Gateway Parks

purchase the Lazy J property in Eagle, Idaho.
6.

January 30, 2014: $40,000 check made payable t0 Ryan Neptune and immediately converted
into a cashier’s check and sent directly to an equipment supplier for Gateway Parks to
purchase 0f a snow groomer by Gateway Parks.
5.

FOF/COL CR at 76,
,

1]

3

1.

Carter Has Never Challenged the Legitimacy of the January 17, 2014
Investment 0f $35,000 Which Was Used to Purchase Real Property or the
January 30, 2014 Investment 0f $40,000 Which Was Used t0 Purchase a Snow

Groomer.
Carter never argued in the First Lawsuit or in this Second Lawsuit that the $35,000 used

toward the purchase of the Lazy Property or the $40,000 used toward purchase 0f a snow

groomer were not legitimate expenses 0r

that they

Parks. Nevertheless, he has at times claimed that he
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were unrelated

is

to the startup

entitled to recover the full

of Gateway

$200,000 of his

He

investment.

does again in his brief on appeal, even though he never challenged the

legitimacy 0f these items in either the First or Second Lawsuit.

II.

The

ON APPEAL

issues in this appeal are as follows:

Did

1.

is

ISSUES

the district court correctly dismiss this case

0n summary judgment because

it

barred by the applicable statutes of limitation?

Did

2.

the district court correctly conclude that this

Second Lawsuit

is

barred by the

doctrine of res judicata?

Did the

3.

because Carter cannot establish

Did

4.

Code

court correctly conclude that this case should be dismissed

district

all

of the required elements of fraud?

the district court correctly

award attorney fees

to

Gateway Parks under Idaho

§ 12-120(3)?

Is

5.

Gateway Parks

entitled t0 costs

on appeal under I.A.R. 40, and attorney fees on

appeal under I.A.R. 41 and I.C. § 12-120(3)?
III.

When
the

an appeal

is

taken of a

same standards under

STANDARD OF REVIEW
summary judgment

I.R.C.P. 56.

Forbush

v.

order, the Idaho

will be

afﬁrmed

the afﬁdavits, if any,

moving party

is

“if the pleadings, depositions,

show

that there is
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Thus, a grant 0f

summary

and admissions on ﬁle, together with

n0 genuine issue

entitled to a judgment as a matter

applies

Sagecrest Multi Family Property Owners’

Assoc, Ina, 162 Idaho 317, 321, 396 P.3d 1199, 1203 (2017).

judgment

Supreme Court

as t0

any material

of law.” I.R.C.P. 56(0).

fact

and

that the

Gateway Parks contends
one of Which
or

all

Larry

that this suit should

sufﬁcient for dismissal. Therefore, the Court

is

of the three grounds. See,
J.

be dismissed 0n three separate grounds,

may afﬁrm the

district court

Where the order 0f the lower court

theory, the order Will be

on any

Southern Idaho Really 0f Twin Falls, Inc. — Century 21

e.g.,

Hellhake and Assocs., Ina, 102 Idaho 613, 614, 636 P.2d 168, 169 (1981)

established rule that

w

afﬁrmed 0n the correct

is

correct but entered

theory.”); White

v.

(“It is

0n a

a well-

different

White, 94 Idaho 26, 28,

P.2d 872, 874 (1971) (“This Court will afﬁrm the judgment below

if

it

v.

480

may be done on any

theory supported by competent evidence.”).

IV.

A.

The

District

Statutes

Court Properly Dismissed This Suit As Barred By The Applicable

Of Limitation.

Introduction.

1.

In this

invested

Second Lawsuit, Carter

by Carter would be used

further alleges that

some 0f

the

in the First

Lawsuit ruled that

properly accounted

The

for.

alleges that

t0 start

all

FOF/COL,

Ryan Neptune represented

that all funds

up Gateway Parks and the individual snow parks. He

money was

expenses of other Neptune businesses.

CR

spent on personal expenses 0f

at 9,

W 5-7 (Complaint).

Ryan Neptune and

As noted

above, the court

of money invested by Carter was spent properly and was

CR at 82, ﬂ C;

and

CR at

120-121.

ﬁrst count of fraudulent inducement in Carter’s Complaint in this second lawsuit

barred by LC. § 5-218(4).

The

includes fraud in the inducement.

not to be

ARGUMENT

deemed

t0

statute sets a three-year statute

The

have accrued

until the discovery,

constituting the fraud 0r mistake.” Id.
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statute states that

of limitation for fraud, Which

“The cause 0f action

by

is

in such case

[is]

the aggrieved party, 0f the facts

The second count of
Securities Act. This count

is

the Complaint

is

for general fraud under the Idaho

Uniform

barred by the statute of limitation in the Act, LC. § 30-14-5010)(2).

Speciﬁcally, the statute bars a cause of action for fraud if not instituted within the earlier of two

years after discovery of the facts constituting the Violation or

2.

Carter’s

Carter

Arguments

makes two arguments

May

17,

2016; and

(ii)

in opposition to the statutes

how money was

Carter

to

made

all

same arguments

personally,

investors in

Arguments Have Already Been
these

spent or the ﬁnancial records of

Ryan Neptune

Parks, and Lansing Superparks were available t0

Carter’s

of limitation defense:

Neptune

Gateway

Industries,

4.

Gateway

FOF/COL,

These arguments were

CR at 68-84;

litigated

CR at

117-129.

was not

credible

and

See pp. 13- 14, supra.

I.C. §

5-218(4) and § 30-14-509G)(2) apply the “discovery” rule in determining

a statute 0f limitations for fraud accrues.

“until the plaintiff

McCorkle

all

Application 0f the “Discovery” Rule in Idaho Statutes 0f Limitation for Fraud.

Both

when

Gateway

Parks.

In addition, the court in the First Lawsuit repeatedly found that Carter

reliable.

he

Litigated.

in the First Lawsuit.

ﬁnal conclusion against him in the First Lawsuit.

and his testimony was not

(i)

he claims he could not and did not access Dropbox Where

the ﬁnancial and accounting records for

3.

after the Violation. Id.

in Opposition t0 the Statutes 0f Limitation Defense.

claims that he had n0 knowledge 0f

Parks until

ﬁve years

v.

The

statute

0f limitations does not begin t0 run

knew or reasonably should have known 0f

Northwestern Mutual Life

Ins. C0.,

(Ct.App. 2005) (emphasis added) (citing

McCoy

141 Idaho 550, 554-55, 112 P.3d 838, 842-42

v.

Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 820 P.2d 360 (1991)).

“[A]s used in the statute, ‘discovery’ means the point in time
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the facts constituting the fraud.

when

the plaintiff

had actual or

constructive

820 P.2d

knowledge of the

at 368)).

facts constituting the fraud.” Id. (citing

“Actual knowledge Will be inferred

McCoy, 120 Idaho

if the allegedly

have discovered the fraud by the exercise 0f due diligence.” McCorkle
(citing

v.

Nancy Lee Mines,

Shultz,

Inc.

v.

at

773,

aggrieved party could

at Id.

(emphasis added)

Harrison, 95 Idaho 546, 547, 511 P.2d 828, 829 (1973); Gerlach

72 Idaho 507, 514, 244 P.2d 1095, 1099 (1952); Mason

v.

Tucker and Associates, 125

Idaho 429, 435, 871 P.2d 846, 852 (Ct.App. 1994)).
Carter failed address 0r refute the “due diligence” requirement in Idaho case law on fraud
at the district court 0r in his brief 0n appeal.

Idaho case law also makes clear that investors
to avoid the bar

at

companies must exercise due diligence

of statutes of limitation, since they have the right to access company records. As

held by the Idaho Supreme Court in

P.2d

in

Nancy Lee Mines,

Inc.

v.

Harrison, 95 Idaho

at

546, 511

828:

The reasoning of

the

Washington Supreme Court

in

Davis

v.

Harrison

is

applicable in this case:

“We

hold that

this action

was barred by

the three year statute of limitations,

Whether appellants had actual knowledge 0f the various transactions 0r not,
for the reason that the facts were open and appeared upon the records of the
corporation, subject to inspection

by

stockholders.

If the stockholders failed

examine the corporate records, they must have been negligent and careless
their own interests.
The means of knowledge were open t0 them, and
means ofknowledge are equivalent t0 actual knowledge.
to

0f

Id. at 547,

511 P.2d

at

829

(citing

added).
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Davis

v.

Harrison, 167 P.2d 1015 (Wash. 1946)) (emphasis

5.

Carter Had Both Actual Knowledge 0f the Alleged Fraud And Could Have
Discovered the Alleged Fraud by the Exercise of Due Diligence Long Before May
17, 2016.

In his Complaint in this

Ryan Neptune

represented that

it

Second Lawsuit, Carter makes the following

would use

business of Gateway Parks, including the

and

(2) “the initial

allegations:

(1)

Carter’s funds “solely for the startup and beginning

new proposed

location in Eagle, Idaho,”

CR

at 9,

ﬂ

5;

bulk of the funds, including the ﬁrst $125,000, as ﬁrst revealed by the bank

statements, were used to

pay overdue

bills

and expenses 0f Neptune personally, and for

Neptune’s other solely owned corporations Neptune Industries,

LLC, which were overdrawn

Inc.

in their respective accounts at the time.”

and [Lansing] Superparks

CR at

9,

Para 7 (brackets

added).

The court

in the First

Lawsuit made

many ﬁndings 0n when

Carter

knew of and

certainly

could and should have discovered through due diligence the banking transactions of Neptune
Industries, Inc. that

o

now takes

issue within this lawsuit.

Carter had full access to all ﬁnancial and accounting information Via Dropbox
beginning in March of 2013 — two months before he even invested for the ﬁrst time in
June, 2013.

0

he

FOF/COL,

CR at 71,

Carter regularly logged 0n to

1]

8.

Dropbox

(Id.)

— Which again

refutes his claim that he did

not 0r could not get on Dropbox.
o

Carter could see

all

of Ryan Neptune’s personal expenses beginning in March of 2013.

Id.

o

Neptune constantly kept Carter and the other investors updated 0n the status 0f
Gateway Parks through emails regarding its business and ﬁnancials and through
Dropbox. FOF/COL, CR at 74, 1] 20.

0

Neptune regularly downloaded the transactions from all the business accounts,
including Gateway Parks, Eagle Superparks, Rockford Superparks, Lansing
Superparks, Planet Snowtools, and Neptune Industries, and made them available on
Dropbox. Id. (emphasis added)
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o

Carter maintained at

trial that

Where Neptune posted them

t0

he could never access the spreadsheets in Dropbox,
keep the investors up-to-date. The Court did not ﬁnd

In April 0f 2013, Neptune speciﬁcally instructed Carter

Carter credible.

access tabs 0n spreadsheets using Google

Docs and how

t0 use

how

Google Docs on

t0

his

phone. Indeed, such instructions would be readily available through an internet search

had Carter truly been unable to ﬁgure out how to use the program. More importantly,
the documentary evidence — namely, Carter’s own communications — reveals that
Carter regularly reviewed the documents that Neptune provided. FOF/COL, CR at 74,

FN 3
0

(emphasis added).

Carter accessed and reviewed the information laid bare t0 him [0n Dropbox]
constantly.

The

CR at 81

FOF/COL,

(emphasis added).

Trial Transcript of the First

Lawsuit also shows that Carter knew or should have

discovered through the exercise of due diligence

long before
o

May 0f201 6.

Carter served 0n
in 2014.

all

of the information he

complains of —

now

A11 pages 0f the Trial Transcript cited in this brief are at

Gateway Parks’ Board of Directors

CR at 88

0f access to

all

(Tr. Trans. at 179,

11.

6-17).

ﬁnancial information 0f the

He

as an investor representative

therefore had the

company

CR 86-1 15.

as

all

same freedom

other Board

Members

and investors.
o

Carter testiﬁed that he found out that

CR at 90

(Tr. Trans. at

294,

11.

1-7).

Ryan Neptune had no money

in July

of 2014.

This certainly gave him grounds to investigate

Ryan Neptune, Gateway Parks, Neptune Industries,
and any of the other entities. The evidence in the Trial Transcript and the ﬁrst
court’s Findings ofFact and Conclusions ofLaw repeatedly show that he regularly
reviewed all of the ﬁnancial information in 2013 and 2014. Even if he could prove
that he did not review the ﬁnancial records at that point, then he chose t0 be
Willﬁllly ignorant. As cited above, under the discovery rule in Idaho one cannot be
willfully ignorant but must exercise due diligence.
the ﬁnancial information of

o

Ryan Neptune

testiﬁed that

when he

shared the Dropbox folder with Carter

it

included the bank statements from Neptune Industries. In addition, he downloaded
all

of the transactions from the Neptune Industries account on a monthly basis.

He

coded spreadsheets 0f the Neptune Industries expenses to show
“where we spent the money, how we spent the money, and Who got the money.”
CR at 100 (Tr. Trans. at 462, 11. 6-25, and at 463, 11. 1-2).
also provided color

o

Ryan Neptune testiﬁed that before Carter even invested, Carter had access to
Dropbox and could see all 0f Ryan’s bank account statements and personal
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CR at

ﬁnancial information, including balances in the accounts.
479,
o

11.

6-1

103 (Rr. Trans. at

1).

Counsel for Carter at one point objected t0 the discussions 0f Dropbox, claiming
that Carter could not access it. The court responded that “Well, it doesn’t 100k like
And whose
there is any dispute about whether he can get into it or not.
it.”
CR at 101 (Tr. Trans. at 469, 11. 20-25
responsibility it is [Carter’s] t0 get into
[brackets added]).

0

The other investor

Gateway Parks

in

unequivocally that he had

coming

out,

and

all

(Tr. Trans. at 517,

full

t0 testify at trial,

access to

expenditures,

all

Decker Rolph, testiﬁed

money coming

debts and liabilities information 0n
14-22). Rolph’s ﬁrst investment

11.

Gateway Parks.
was also in 2013.

in,

money

CR at

107

0

Decker Rolph ﬁthher testiﬁed that he had access t0 all of the Neptune-related bank
account statements and downloaded transactions. He had “consistent access t0
bank accounts, you know, the activity 0f the capital activity, the monetary activity
0f the business. It was all there.” CR at 108 (Tr.TranS. at 547, 11. 17-22).

0

Carter admitted that he looked through the emails that

information

on the

spreadsheets.”

Tr. Trans. at 656,

from the record on appeal and
o

Ryan Neptune

is

Ryan Neptune sent him with
went through “most of the
18-23. (This page was inadvertently omitted

and

companies,

11.

that

he

attached t0 this brief as EX.

personally showed Carter

how

to access everything

CR

along With using Google Docs to View things on Dropbox.
at

662,

11.

9-20; and 663,

Many more examples from the

11.

In addition to having full access t0

at trial

ﬁnancial information he

now

May of 2016.

at

on Dropbox,

111 (Tr. Trans.

16-20).

have not been included for the sake of brevity.

Trial Transcript

testimony and exhibits

1).

all

ﬁnancial information for

all

companies, the

demonstrated that Carter had actual knowledge 0f the very

claims not to have discovered until

Speciﬁcally, the evidence at

trial

showed

Ryan Neptune’s

that Carter

deposition in

had actual knowledge

in July

0f 2013 of how his $100,000 invested in June 0f 2013 was spent. This time period includes most
of the transactions that Carter

and 673,

11.

1-5)

now

takes issue with. See

(where Ryan Neptune told Carter
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how

CR at

his

112

(Tr. Trans. at 672,

11.

12 -25,

$100,000 invested in June was being

spent);

CR

and

at

money was being
6.

112-1 13 (Tr. Trans. at 675,

16-26, and 676,

spent and had seen the spreadsheets showing

Summary and

payments beginning

all

in April

June of 2013. That

11.

knew how

1-15) (Carter

how the money was being

the

spent).

Conclusion.

Carter had access to

in

11.

ﬁnancial information, bank account statements, expenditures and

money was

spent in June 0f 2013.

invested $100,000

In July 0f 2013, he

2013 bank statement of Neptune

actually reviewed the June

He

0f 2013, before he ever invested any money.

been deposited and spent, nearly [we years before he ﬁled

Industries,

had access

where

Second Lawsuit 0n

this

his

to

and

money had

May

14,

2018.

Carter invested another $25,000 in August of 2013, and $75,000 in January of 2014. A11

bank statements

for

Ryan Neptune, Neptune

When

through February of 2014,

all

Industries,

and Gateway Parks from July of 2013

funds invested by Carter had been spent, were uploaded t0

Dropbox each month. This was over four years before he ﬁled
The court

in the First

at the information.

the information laid bare t0

replete with admissions

Second Lawsuit.

Lawsuit speciﬁcally found, twice, that Carter actually and regularly

logged 0n t0 Dropbox t0 look

and reviewed

this

by Carter

that

That court also found that “Carter accessed

him constantly[.]” FOF/COL,

he looked

at the

CR at

81.

The record

is

information on Dropbox on numerous

occasions.

Carter’s testimony in the First Lawsuit that even though he

Dropbox would be

willful ignorance if true.

The decision

in

had access, he did not 100k

Nancy Lee Mines makes

clear that

investors are negligent, careless and cannot avoid the statute 0f limitations if they d0 not

the

company

P.2d

at

records,

Which they have both a

829.
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right

and an obligation

t0 d0.

95 Idaho

at

at

examine
547, 5 11

Based on the foregoing, Gateway Parks respectfully requests
dismissal 0f the current suit as being time barred

in the inducement,

LC.

§ 5-218(4),

was both available and

and two years before he ﬁled
B.

this

of limitation for fraud under the

The information necessary

actually reviewed

Second Lawsuit on

This Second Lawsuit Is Barred

statute

30-14-5090)(2).

I.C. §

Court afﬁrm the

the three-year statute 0f limitation for fraud

and the two-year

Idaho Uniform Securities Act 0f 2004,
learn 0f any potential fraud

by

that the

May

14,

by Carter long before

to

three

2018.

By Res Judicata.

Principles 0f Res Judicata.

1.

Res judicata precludes the
in a prior proceeding

relitigation

0f a matter previously litigated to ﬁnal conclusion

between the same parties or

their privies.

Systems Associates,

Inc.

v.

Motorola Communications and Electronics, Ina, 116 Idaho 615, 617, 778 P.2d 737, 739 (1989).

The

applicability 0f res judicata is a pure question of law.

552, 555, 768 P.2d 815, 818 (Ct. App. 1989).
dismissal

is

Cir. 1985).

appropriate.” Fellowship 0f Christ

Accord Devil Creek Ranch

v.

“When

Church

See Cole

v.

Kunzler, 115 Idaho

the doctrine of res judicata applies,

Thorbum, 758 F.2d 1140, 1141

v.

Cedar Mesa Res.

&

(6th

Canal Ca, 123 Idaho 634, 637,

851 P.2d 348, 351 (1993).
2.

The Element 0f “Same

Parties” Is

Met in This

Case.

Carter argued before the district court and again in this appeal that res judicata does not

apply because Gateway Parks was not a party to the First Lawsuit. This argument

Idaho law. The Idaho Supreme Court has
applies t0 the party against

whom

the issue [of res judicata]

asserted
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made

clear that requirement

the doctrine ofjudicata

was a party

is

applied.

is

contrary to

0f same party or

its

“[T]he party against

privy

whom

or in privity with a party to the prior litigation.”

Union Paciﬁc Land Resources Corp.

v.

Shoshone County Assessor, 140 Idaho 528, 534, 96 P.3d

629, 635 (2004) (emphasis and brackets added) (citing

Lohma

v.

Flynn, 139 Idaho 312, 319, 78

P.3d 379, 386 (2003)). Clearly, the doctrine applies against the Carters, the very same Plaintiffs
in the First

Lawsuit and against

Even though

it is

whom res judicata is

asserted.

not necessary, Gateway Parks, the Respondent in this case,

With Ryan Neptune and Neptune Industries,

Who

issue in this second suit

solicited investment funds for

were deposited

into the

Gateway

1]

3

(Neptune Aff.

at 2,

ﬂ

Parks, the Respondent in this

Gateway Parks

is

3).

suit.

in privity with

Neptune Industries
Id.

is

is

is

Ryan

described in this

The investment ﬁmds

Parks.

bank account 0f Neptune

funds were spent from that account. Neptune Industries
at 60,

in privity

Defendants in the First Lawsuit.

Inc., the

Neptune formed both Neptune Industries and Gateway Parks. Ryan Neptune
lawsuit as the agent

is

Industries, Inc.

and the

wholly owned by Ryan Neptune.

also the

at

CR

Managing Member 0f Gateway

Thus, the Plaintiffs in the two lawsuits are identical, and

Ryan Neptune and Neptune

Industries

who were

the Defendants

in the First Lawsuit.

3.

Carter’s Fraud Claims Are Barred by Res Judicata.

Even

if Carter’s

two fraud claims

labels, they are still barred

been raised in the
litigated

deemed

to

be “new” claims, because of their

Which

Under Idaho law,

arise

res judicata bars not only the claims actually

from a common nucleus 0f operative

Shirey, 126 Idaho 63, 878 P.2d 762 (1994);
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new

These “new” claims certainly could and should have

parties in a prior proceeding, but also all claims that could

in a prior proceeding

v.

res judicata.

First Lawsuit.

between the

National Bank

by

are

Diamond

v.

have been raised

facts.

See Farmers

Farmers Group, 119

Idaho 146, 804 P.2d 319 (1990);
1985);

andAldape
In these

money

v.

two

Gateway

in

six investment

McDonald

Barlow, 109 Idaho 101, 705 P.2d 1056 (Ct.App.

v.

Akins, 105 Idaho 254, 668 P.2d 130 (Ct. App. 1983),pet. rev. den.

lawsuits, the

same

set

0f operative facts are as follows.

Ryan Neptune received

Parks.

payments were deposited

the investment funds from Carter. Four 0f the

in the checking account

because Gateway Parks had not yet been formed

at the

were then disbursed by Neptune Industries for expenses
Carter has

now complained about how the ﬁmds were

Just because Carter’s

two new claims

0f Neptune Industries,

time 0f those investments.

relating to the startup of

by Judge Burnett of the Idaho Court of Appeals

Second Restatement. Prior

n. 1,

776 P.2d

Under
rev.

den,

it is

at

466

in Blaser

Gateway

First, Carter’s

v.

present claims were

suit.

Second, as noted

Cameron, 116 Idaho 453, 776 P.2d

of res judicata had become conﬁJsed because

limited res judicata t0 the relitigation of ‘causes of action.’” Id. at

n. 1.

the analysis in

Aldape

Akins, 105 Idaho 254, 668 P.2d 130 (Ct. App. 1983), pet.

v.

clear that Carter’s present claims arise out 0f the

same transaction or

set

0f

In Aldape, the Idaho Court of Appeals explained as follows:

[T]he transactional concept of a claim
preclusion

is

Where there

similarly broad

is

Parks.

“Darrar antedates our Aldape decision and the

to Aldape, the operation

some Idaho cases purportedly
457

concurring):

The funds

are stylized as causes 0f action for fraud does not

squarely at issue in the First Lawsuit and were fully litigated in the prior

J.

Inc.

spent in these two lawsuits.

prevent dismissal based 0n res judicata for two reasons.

462 (Ct.App. 1989) (Burnett,

Carter invested

.

.

.

is

broad, and

.

.

.

the bar of claim

[T]he bar 0f claim preclusion

may

apply even

not a substantial overlap between the theories advanced in support

0f a claim, or in the evidence relating t0 those theories.
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facts.

Id. at

The court then quoted

259, 668 P.2d at 135.

Judgments

§

the test

from the Restatement (Second) 0f

24 (1982):

What

factual grouping constitutes a “transaction”

be determined
pragmatically, giving weight t0 such considerations as whether the facts are
related in time, space, origin, 0r motivation, whether they form a convenient trial
unit,

and Whether

their treatment as a unit

.

.

conforms

[is]

.

to

to the parties’ expectations

0r business understanding or usage.

The court

further held that under the rules 0f claim preclusion, “the effect 0f a

to the litigation

of

all

issues relevant to the

same claim between

the

same

judgment extends

parties

whether 0r not

raised at trial.” Aldage at 257, 668 P.2d at 133 (emphasis added).

The merits 0f
Second Lawsuit were
Carter calls these

arise

Carter’s

two fraud claims (Whether money was spent improperly)

fully litigated in the First Lawsuit.

“new” 0r

“different” claims, they are

from the same transactions or

Lawsuit.

common

See Section IV.B.4,

still

claims clearly

fall

Second Lawsuit

9

as construed

Although

barred by res judicata because they

nucleus 0f operative facts involved in the First

These claims could and should have been raised in

breadth 0f the term “claim,’

infra.

in this

that suit.

When

one considers the

under Idaho law and the Restatement, these

latest

Within the same transaction 0r set 0f operative facts as the First Lawsuit. This

is

precisely the sort of repetitious and piecemeal litigation that res judicata

is

intended t0 prevent.
In

Farmers National Bank

Supreme Court held
in

v.

Shirey, 126 Idaho 63, 878 P.2d

762 (1994), the Idaho

that

an action between the same parties upon the same claim or demand, the former

adjudication concludes parties and privies not only as to every matter offered and

received to sustain 0r defeat the claim but also as t0 every matter which might

have and should have been litigated in the ﬁrst suit.
[Where] the underlying
operative facts are the same for both cases, all claims that could have been
brought in the ﬁrst action are now barred.
.
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.

Id. at 70,

878 P.2d

at

769 (emphasis added). See also Diamond

146, 804 P.2d 3 19 (1990), in

Farmers Group, 119 Idaho

v.

which the Idaho Supreme Court reafﬁrmed Idaho’s adoption 0f the

“transactional” approach to claim preclusion, stating that “[a] valid and ﬁnal

in

an action extinguishes

all

claims arising out offhe

same

judgment rendered

transaction 0r series 0ftransacti0ns

out 0f Which the cause of action arose.” Id. at 150, 804 P.2d at 322 (emphasis added). Here, the

series

of investment checks by Carter and

series

of transactions

at issue in the First

how

they were spent are the same transactions and

Lawsuit.

The Court

0f a cause 0f action for purposes of application of the doctrine of res judicata

examining the operative
In

McDonald

v.

facts underlying the

two lawsuits.”

“The ‘sameness’

further held that

Id. at 149,

804 P.2d

is

determined by

at 322.

Barlow, 109 Idaho 101, 705 P.2d 1056 (Ct.App. 1985), the court

acknowledged the general

rule that “a

Which were 0r could have been

judgment entered

litigated.”

Id. at 104,

is

res judicata with respect t0 all issues

705 P.2d

at

1059 (emphasis added). The

court then declared that

[b]y preventing multiple

litigation

important fundamental purposes.
judicial dispute resolution

0f the same claim, res judicata furthers
The doctrine preserves the acceptability of

by preventing

inconsistent results;

interest in protecting the courts against the

it

serves the public

burdens 0f repetitious

litigation;

and

it

advances the private interest in repose from the harassment afrepetitive claims.
Id.

(emphasis added).
A11 of these important objectives are at stake in this second lawsuit ﬁled by Carter.

this

Court were to reverse the decision 0f the

claim that the expenditures

at issue

the result in the First Lawsuit in

district court

were fraudulent,

and allow Carter

that ruling

Which the court found,

would be

after a

-
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proceed on the

the exact opposite of

5-day bench

expenses were appropriate startup expenses relating to Gateway Parks;
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t0

If

trial,

(ii) all

that

(i) all

expenses were

made

properly accounted for and

available to Carter for review;

beneﬁt personally from the expenses; and

own money
Lawsuit and

Ryan Neptune

Gateway Parks which more than

into

this

(iv)

offset

Ryan Neptune

did not

infused another $125,000 0f his

any claims by Carter in the

CR at 68-84;

Second Lawsuit. See FOF/COL,

(iii)

and Mem. Decision,

First

CR at

120-

121.

4.

The Legitimacy of the Expenses Carter Now Claims Were Fraudulent Has
Already Been Fully Litigated to Final Conclusion after a Five—Day Trial, Two
Written Decisions by the Court in the First Lawsuit, and a Final Judgment that
Carter Did Not Appeal.

In his brief

on appeal, Carter claims

raised in the First Lawsuit. Appellants

Lawsuit, Carter had a

expenses he

now

full

and

fair

’

that

no issue about alleged misuse of funds was

Opening Brief,

at 2.

This

is

simply not

true.

In the First

opportunity to challenge and did challenge the very same

challenges in this Second Lawsuit.

The court

in the First

Lawsuit heard and

addressed both the factual and legal issues related t0 the alleged misuse of ﬁmds. This

throughout the transcript of the

trial

and the decisions of the court

Industries, Inc. for unjust enrichment.

Ryan Neptune and Neptune

See Amended Complaint in

First Lawsuit,

Speciﬁcally, Carter alleged that “Defendants have been unjustly enriched
for their beneﬁcial business interests without paying

[loan] use only.” Id.

At

trial,

CR at

0n Carter’s

Neptune did not disclose
Superparks,

132,

LLC

that (1) the

Lansing operation had unpaid
-

at 131-33.

the said funds

back the funds advanced for short term

by

his attorney, Carter testiﬁed that

bank accounts 0f Neptune

money

bills that

28

by using

CR

8.

direct examination

did not have
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1]

shown

in the First Lawsuit.

Carter brought a claim against

In the First Lawsuit,

is

in

them

needed

to

Industries, Inc.

Ryan

and Lansing

just prior t0 Carter investing funds; (2) the

be paid,

(3) that

Ryan used some 0f the

Carter

money

make

to

money to add
1-3).

a mortgage payment on his house, and (4) that

t0 his children’s savings accounts.

CR at 87

These are the very same expenses that Carter

On
was going

now

(Tr. Trans. at 45,

complains 0f in

cross-examination 0f Carter, Carter admitted that
t0

Ryan used some of the

this

11.

Carter

11-25 and 46,

11.

Second Lawsuit.

Ryan Neptune had

told

him

that

he

spend some of the money 0n insurance in advance of forming Gateway Parks, that

he was buying equipment, that he needed $25,000 for legal fees to obtain trademarks for

Gateway Parks, and money was being spent on

travel expenses.

CR

at

89

(Tr. Trans. at 204,

11.

3-23).

Then, on direct examination of Ryan Neptune by counsel for Carter, counsel fully
challenged Neptune on

all

of the expenses that are

now

being complained about

a_zga_in

in this

Second Lawsuit. Speciﬁcally, Mr. Manwaring asked Mr. Neptune about the following expenses
as

shown

Payment

in the

to

bank records 0f Neptune

Industries, Inc.:

Wells Fargo on a business

credit card for business travel

and operating

CR at 92
(Tr. Trans. at 393,

11.

8-15)

11.

18-25)

11.

1-3)

11.

5-15);

11.

13- 1 6)

11.

17-20)

expenses

$1,000 payment t0 Ryan Neptune’s personal account

CR at 92
(Tr. Trans. at 393,

$2500 payment to Lansing Superparks, LLC,
(soon to be a subsidiary 0f Gateway Parks)

CR at 92

$20,000 check and $5,000 check paid for legal fees

CR at 92

for drafting the

Gateway Parks” operating

(Tr. Trans. at 394,

(Tr. Trans. at 394,

agreement

(Tr. Trans. at 395,

Neptune Industries’ bank account
was overdrawn

CR at 92

$1,400 payment to Johnson Co.,
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CPAS

(Tr. Trans. at 395,

CR at 93

and

for accounting services

(Tr. Trans. at 396,

Texas Roadhouse (restaurant)

CR at 93
(Tr. Trans. at 396,

Cobby’s

$18,000 payment t0 Lansing Superparks, LLC
(soon to be a subsidiary 0f Gateway Parks)

CR at 93

$1,000 payment t0 Ryan Neptune’s personal account.

CR at 93

397

$1,500 payment t0 Planet Snowtools.
(a subsidiary of Neptune Industries)

CR at 93

$4,408 mortgage payment 0n Ryan
Neptune home and 3,000 square foot
shop (used by all of the Gateway Parks companies

CR at 93

in

19-25)

at

11.

8-10)

11.

22—25)

11.

1-8)

11.

9—13)

401,

11.

3—8)

at401,

11.

11-16)

at401,

11.

17-19)

11.

20-25,

402,

11.

4—6)

402,

11.

7—14)

(Tr. Trans. at 398,

(Tr. Trans. at 398,

FOF/COL)

$2,686 paid 0n Wells Fargo Home
Equity account — used as a business
line

11.

(Tr. Trans. at 397, 11.1 1—19)

(Tr. Trans. at 397,

shown

3—8)

CR at 93

(restaurant)

(Tr. Trans. at

as

11.

CR at 94
(Tr. Trans. at

of credit.

$146 payment 0n a personal
Ryan Neptune

line

0f credit of

CR at 94
(Tr. Trans.

CR at 94

Baja Fresh (restaurant)

(Tr. Trans.

$450

$450

t0 son’s savings account.

to another son’s savings account.

CR at 94
(Tr. Trans. at

401,

and 402

1-2)

at

11.

CR at 94
(Tr. Trans. at

$1500 payment

t0 Planet

Snowtools

CR at 94
(Tr. Trans. at
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$1,157 to Wells Fargo direct pay
(for employee wages)

CR at 94

$1,350 payment to Capital One card
used for travel

CR at 94

$5,587 to check card for legal fees

CR at 94-95

(Tr. Trans. at

(Tr. Trans. at

(Tr. Trans. at

and 404,

11.

15-25)

403,

11.

12-15)

403,

11.

18-23;

404,

11.

8-12)

404,

11.

13-18)

404,

11.

19-25)

1-7)

(Tr. Trans. at

CR at 95

Sports Authority

(Tr. Trans. at

CR at 95

$5,130 direct pay t0 employees

(Tr. Trans. at

$2,300 for cashier’s check to JK Impact
(web design for Gateway Parks)

CR at 95
(Tr.

Trans

and 406,

$385 payment 0n Chase

at

11.

Illinois

2-25

406,

11.

15-18)

CR at 95
(Tr. Trans. at

and 407,

11.

406, 11.19-25

1-2)

CR at 95

Two Airline tickets

(Tr. Trans. at

0f Gateway Parks logo

(Tr. Trans. at
11.

CR at 96

(for powder coating 0f equipment to be
used by Gateway Parks at Lansing Superparks)

(Tr. Trans. at

Payment 0n Fred Meyer Credit Card.

CR at 96
(Tr. Trans. at

31

11.

14-24)

407,

11.

25 and

408,

11.

5-16)

408,

11.

17-21)

1-4)

$4,292 to Boise Fence C0.

-

407,

CR at 95-96
408,
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11.

CR at 95

credit card

$261 Tollway charges for travel in

405,

1-9)

(Tr. Trans. at

to designer

11.

CR at 95

$1,550 t0 Lansing Superparks.

$1500

402,

$100 payment

t0

iTunes for cloud storage

for computers

CR at 96
(Tr. Trans. at

and 409,

$500 draw

for

11.

409,

11.

4—6)

409,

11.

7—9)

410,

11.

1016)

CR at 96

Ryan Neptune.

CR at 96

Fred Meyer

(Tr. Trans. at

Other credit card purchases, expenses,

CR at 96

and draws

(Tr. Trans. at

Payment 0f taxes which causes

the account

be being overdrawn

CR at 96
(Tr. Trans. at

Bounced checks and overdraft fees because
Neptune Industries account is overdrawn

(Tr. Trans. at
11.

CR at 97

for June 0f 2013

(Tr. Trans. at

is

overdrawn

1—5)

41

1, 11.

1-25 t0

414,

11.

1—9)

414,

11.

21—24)

415,

11.

3-10)

415,

11.

16—24)

416,

11.

7—9)

CR at 97
(Tr. Trans. at

Lansing Superparks overdraft fees

1, 11.

1-244)

Bank Statement of Lansing Superparks, LLC

Lansing Superparks account

41

CR at 96-97
413,

CR at 97
(Tr. Trans. at

Payments by Lansing Superparks to Great
Harvest, Dixon Container, Century Arena,
and IRS

CR at 97

$2,000 for employee wages

CR at 98

(Tr. Trans. at

(Tr. Trans. at

$2,700 t0

22-25

1-3)

(Tr. Trans. at

to

11.

408,

CR at 98

CPAs

(Tr. Trans. 416,

Later in the

trial,

11.

10-1 1)

Mr. Manwaring, counsel for Carter, again raised these same issues and

expenses in another line of questioning:
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you t0 know — I’m just going to list some things here
that Dr. Carter’s checks were endorsed, put into this bank account [Neptune
Industries, Inc.], and the bank account shows that they were spent on credit card
Okay,

And would

it

surprise

—

debt, line of credit debt, past attorney bills, past accountant bills, personal draws,

$4,800 0n his

home mortgage payment,
home line of equity, $900

payments on a
hundreds 0f dollars spent

at

that’s

Neptune’s

home

mortgage,

to his children’s savings accounts,

LLC

Fred Meyer, back wages for Superparks

employees, over $10,000 to IRS taxes, and various other amounts t0 local

fast

food and restaurants.

CR at

109

At

(Tr. Trans. at 586,

11.

9-20) (brackets added).

the conclusion of the

Lawsuit speciﬁcally ruled that

Gateway Parks,

LLC was

trial,

all

in

two separate written opinions, the court

of these expenses were legitimate.

not yet formed

When

It

in the First

also explained that

Carter advanced the ﬁrst $125,000 0f the

$200,000, and that the $125,000 was deposited into Neptune Industries, Inc.’s account for use by
it

and the other Neptune companies

to get

Gateway Parks and

the individual

snow

terrain parks

up and running.
In the Findings

ofFact and Conclusions ofLaw, the court speciﬁcally addressed Carter’s

claim for unjust enrichment based on the expenses noted above:

Because Gateway Parks was not yet formed, the funds were deposited into
Neptune Industries, Inc. ’s bank account. The funds were used by Neptune for
legal fees and other associated expenses for the start—up company [Gateway
Parks].

FOF/COL,

CR at 73,

1]

18 (emphasis and brackets added).

no evidence

The court went

0n:

Defendants received any personal beneﬁt from the
All oz the funds were properly accounted for as capital
funds advanced.
contributions t0 Gateway Parks in exchange for an ownership interest in the

There

is

that

company. They were used t0 purchase capital assets and real property and were
also used for operating expenses such as legal fees associated with company
formation [Gateway Parks], insurance, and due diligence.
Consequently,
Plaintiffs cannot recover under their unjust enrichment theory.

FOF/COL,

CR 82, ﬂ C (emphasis and brackets added).
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The court ruled
motion by Carter

the

t0 alter 0r

same way,

again,

amend the

court’s ruling:

Finally, Plaintiffs seek

and

judgment

in

even more

detail, in

in their favor for

unjust enrichment claim, arguing that the evidence

response to a post—trial

$165,000 on

was uncontroverted

their

that these

advances were made payable to Ryan Neptune personally, deposited in Neptune
Industries’ bank account and used for Defendants’ own expenses rather than for

Gateway. While the advances [by Carter] were made payable to Mr. Neptune
and deposited in Neptune Industries’ bank account, this Courtfound n0 evidence

any personal beneﬁt from the funds advanced. All 0f
thefunds were properly accountedfor as capital contributions t0 Gateway Parks
that Defendants received

exchangefor an ownership interest in the company. Neptune credibly testiﬁed
were used t0 purchase capital assets, real properly, and usedfor
operating expenses such as legalfees associated with [the] company [Gateway
Parks]. Tr. Trans. 485214 — 486: 14; 673:4-5. Neptune also provided receipts for
Gateway’s various capital expenses. Exh. 132, Tr. Trans. 754:12-18. Indeed,
Neptune regularly downloaded and color coded the ﬁnancial transactions t0
show Plaintiffs how the investment funds were being used. EXh. 160; Tr. Trans
479: 12 — 485:5. The exhibits Plaintiffs relied upon in advancing their argument
did not unequivocally show that Defendant used Plaintiffs’ advances for
personal reasons and certainly did not satisfy Plaintiffs’ burden 0f proof on the
For example, the mortgage payment 0n the Neptunes’ properly was a
issue.
business expense because it was made pursuant t0 a lease agreement between
the Neptunes and Neptune Industries for Gateway’s use 0f a Shop 0n the
Neptunes ’properlyfor equipment storage. Tr. Trans. 473:22 — 475:2. Likewise,
the various charges for food were per—diem expenses for traveling Gateway
in

that the funds

.

.

.

employees.

T0 the extent any portion of the advances was used temporarily for nonGateway purposes, Defendants infused $125,000 of their own funds into
Gateway, Which would more than make up for any temporary personal use of the
advances. Exh. 143; Tr. Trans. 490117 — 491121. Further, there is n0 dispute
that Plaintiffs received

Thus,

how

an

interest in

Gateway

Defendants ultimately used

because Plaintiffs cannot show damages.

CR at

120-121.
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in

Plaintiffs’

exchange for

money

is

their advances.

ultimately irrelevant

Summary 0f Res Judicata Argument.

5.

This case involves the same Plaintiffs as in the First Lawsuit. The requirement of privity
applies t0 the parties against

whom

the defense 0f res judicate

is

raised.

The

Plaintiffs in this

case are not only in privity with the current Plaintiffs, they are the identical parties.

This case arises from the same set 0f operative facts as the First Lawsuit. Carter invested

money

in

Gateway Parks and then wanted

his fraud claims in the First Lawsuit.

t0 get

it

back. Carter could and should have brought

The decisions and judgment

in the First

Lawsuit are

conclusive against Carter both for claims that were brought and claims that could have been

brought in the First Lawsuit.
Lastly, all of the expenses/payments at issue in Carter’s fraud claims in this lawsuit

The court

actually raised and litigated in the First Lawsuit.

were

in that suit expressly found, in

two

separate written opinions, that these expenses were legitimate, properly accounted for, and were

incurred as part of the startup 0f Gateway Parks.
Therefore, this appeal should be denied and the grant 0f

summary judgment

in favor

of

Gateway Parks should be afﬁrmed.
C.

Court Correctly Found That Carter Cannot Establish All Required
Elements Of His Fraud Claims.

The

To

District

successfully bring an action for fraud in Idaho, a plaintiff must establish the existence

0f the following elements:

(1) a statement or a representation

materiality; (4) the speaker’s

knowledge 0f

reliance; (6) the hearer’s ignorance

of the

falsity

justiﬁable reliance; and (9) resultant injury.

(2002).

its

falsity;

v.

fact; (2) its falsity; (3) its

(5) the speaker’s intent that there

0f the statement;

Trees

0f

(7) reliance

Kersey, 138 Idaho

3, 10,

by

be

the hearer; (8)

56 P.3d 765, 772

Idaho Rule 0f Civil Procedure 56(c) governs the grant 0f summary judgment on the
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issue 0f fraud. Lettunich

fn.

1

Key Bank Nat.

v.

Ass'n, 141 Idaho 362, 368 fn.

1,

109 P.3d 1104, 1110

(2005).

Carter cannot

falsity,

justiﬁable reliance, or resultant injury.

Falsity.

1.

In this

invested

show

Second Lawsuit, Carter

by Carter would be used

alleges that

Ryan Neptune represented

solely for the startup

and beginning business 0f Gateway

CR at 9, ﬂ 6. He then claims

Parks, including the

new park

ﬁmds were

Ryan Neptune’s personal expenses and expenses of Neptune

spent 0n

in Eagle, Idaho.

and [Lansing] Superparks. LLC.

Id. at

11

Complaint,

There

is

Industries, Inc.

at the heart

of the

found and concluded as follows:

n0 evidence

the funds advanced.

that the

7.

This very issue was litigated in the First Lawsuit with Gateway Parks
case. After a 5-day trial, the court

that all funds

that Defendants received

any personal beneﬁt from

All oz the funds were properly accounted for as cagital

Gateway Parks in exchange for an ownership interest in the
company. They were used t0 purchase capital assets and real property [for
Gateway Parks] and were also used for operating expenses [for Gateway Parks]
such as legal fees associated with company formation, insurance, and due
diligence. Consequently, Plaintiffs cannot recover under their unjust enrichment
contributions t0

theory.

FOF/COL,
in

CR at 82, ﬂ C.

even more

ruling.

See

detail, in

CR at

(emphasis added). The court in the First Lawsuit reafﬁrmed

its

ruling,

response t0 a post-trial motion by Carter to try to change the court’s

120-121.

Based 0n these previous ﬁndings and conclusions, Carter cannot prove the element of
falsity to support his fraud claim.

relating t0 the startup of

None of the money was

Gateway Parks.
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misspent. A11 0f

it

went

to

expenses

2.

Justifiable Reliance.

Carter cannot establish that he justiﬁably relied

how money was
to all

spent

by Ryan Neptune and Neptune

upon any alleged misrepresentations of

Industries, Inc.

0f the accounting and ﬁnancial records as shown above. In

387, 613 P.2d 1338 (1980), the Idaho Supreme Court held that

When

Faw

v.

“When

Carter had full access

Greenwood, 101 Idaho

opportunity to conduct an independent investigation 0f the records and does so,

held that he

P.2d
that

at

is

1340.

is

given the

it is

generally

a purchaser

not entitled to rely on alleged misrepresentations of the seller.” Id. at 389, 613

The record shows

that Carter

had access

t0 all the necessary ﬁnancial records

he did in fact access them “regularly” and “constantly” as held by the court in the

Lawsuit. Therefore, he cannot
0r attempted t0 distinguish

3.

show

and

First

“justiﬁable reliance.” Carter has not addressed, questioned,

Faw v. Greenwood or this

established principle of Idaho law.

Resultant Injury.

Carter also cannot

and he has the

ﬁlll

show any

injury 0r damages.

He

invested

money

in

beneﬁt of that investment today. As held by the Court in the

Gateway Parks

First Lawsuit:

“While the advances [by Carter] were made payable t0 Mr. Neptune and
deposited in Neptune Industries’ bank account, this Court found n0 evidence that
Defendants received any personal beneﬁt from the funds advanced. A11 of the
funds were properly accounted for as capital contributions t0 Gateway in
exchange for an ownership interest in the company. Neptune credibly testiﬁed
that the funds were used to purchase capital assets, real property, and used for
operating expenses such as legal fees associated With [the] company.

485: 14

— 486: 14;

Tr. Trans.

67324-5. Neptune also provided receipts for Gateway’s various

Exh. 132, Tr. Trans. 754: 12-18. Indeed, Neptune regularly
downloaded and color coded the ﬁnancial transactions to show Plaintiffs how the
investment funds were being used. EXh. 160; Tr. Trans 479: 12 — 485:5.”
capital expenses.

***
“T0 the extent any portion of the advances was used temporarily for nonGateway purposes, Defendants infused $125,000 0f their own funds into
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Gateway, which would more than make up for any temporary personal use of the
advances. EXh. 143; Tr. Trans. 490217 — 491 :21. Further, there is n0 disgute that
Plaintiffs received an interest in Gateway in exchange for their advances. Thus,
how Defendants ultimately used Plaintiffs’ money is ultimately irrelevant
because Plaintiffs cannot show damages.

CR at

120-121.

Thus, Carter has n0 damages.
functioning company; and Carter
investment.

As held by

is

He

invested in

Gateway Parks; Gateway Parks

the court in the First Lawsuit, Carter cannot

a

amount 0f

his

show damages based 0n

the

owner of the business based on

a part

is

the

Carter also cannot re-litigate these issues based on the doctrine of

expenditures he challenges.

issue preclusion.

“Issue preclusion protects litigants from litigating an identical issue with the

same party or

privy.”

its

(2007) (citing Rodriguez

Ticor Title C0.

Dep

v.

’t

v.

Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 123, 157 P.3d 613, 617

0fC0rr., 136 Idaho 90, 92, 29 P.3d 401, 402 (2001)).

Since Carter cannot establish

all

nine 0f the required elements for fraud, his fraud claims

should be dismissed 0n summary judgment, and this appeal should be denied.

D.

The

Proper
1.

Award Of Costs And
And Should Be Afﬁrmed.

District Court’s

fees

and costs

is

Within the discretion 0f the

an abuse of discretion standard of review.” Smith

367, 375 (2004) (With citations).

Gateway Parks

Under Idaho law,
civil action.

Is

costs

-

38

court and subject

Mitton, 140 Idaho 893, 901, 104 P.3d at
fees has the burden

Id.

the Prevailing Party.

and attorney fees are only awardable

I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(B).
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v.

trial

“The party disputing the award of attorney

0f showing an abuse 0f discretion.”
2.

Was

Standard 0f Review of An Award 0f Attorney Fees.

“An award 0f attorney
to

Attorney Fees T0 Gateway Parks

to the prevailing party in a

In this case, the district court entered

summary judgment

in

favor 0f

Gateway Parks 0n

the fraud claims brought

by

Carter.

CR

at

On

725-733.

June 20,

2019, the Court entered a Judgment 0f Dismissal dismissing the claims in this case with
prejudice.

3.

CR at 818-19.
The

District

Fees

And

Therefore,

Gateway Parks

is

the prevailing party.

Court Correctly Held That Gateway Parks

Is Entitled

T0 Attorney

Costs Under I.C. § 12-120(3).

Idaho Code § 12-120(3) provides:
(3) In

any

negotiable

civil action t0

recover 0n an open account, account stated, note,

bill,

instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of

goods, wares, merchandise, or services and in any commercial transaction unless
law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable

otherwise provided by

be

set

by the

facts

of

this case

attorney’s fee to

Whether the
the

made by the Supreme Court

462, 259 P.3d 608 (201

court, to

be taxed and collected as

costs.

involve a commercial transaction

as a matter of law.

As

set forth in

is

Garner

a determination t0

v.

Povey, 15 1 Idaho

1):

Whether a

district court

has correctly determined that a case

is

based 0n a

commercial transaction for the purpose of LC. § 12—120(3) is a question 0f law
over which this Court exercises free review. Great Plains, 136 Idaho at 470, 36
P.3d at 222. Idaho Code § 12—120(3) allows for an award 0f attorney fees t0 the
prevailing party in a civil action to recover “in any commercial transaction.” A
commercial transaction includes all transactions except those for personal or
household purposes. I.C. § 12—120(3). In determining whether attorney fees should
be awarded under LC. § 12—120(3), the Court has conducted a tWO-step analysis:
“(1) there must be a commercial transaction that is integral to the claim; and (2)
the commercial transaction must be the basis upon which recovery is sought.”
Great Plains, 136 Idaho at 471, 36 P.3d at 223 (internal quotation marks omitted).
“The commercial transaction must be an actual basis 0f the complaint... [T]he
lawsuit and the causes of action must be based on a commercial transaction, not
simply a situation that can be characterized as a commercial transaction.” Id. In
other words, the relevant inquiry is Whether the commercial transaction constituted
“the gravamen 0f the lawsuit,” and was the basis on which a party is attempting to
recover. Id. at 472, 36 P.3d at 224.

Garner

v.

Povey, 151 Idaho
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469-70, 259 P.3d at 615-16 (201

39

1).

Similarly, in applying Idaho

as

§ 12-120(3), the

commercial When the purpose for entering

Stevens

v.

Code

Court has “characterized a transaction

im‘o the transaction

t0

generate income.”

Eyer, 161 Idaho 407, 412, 387 P.3d 75, 50 (2016) (emphasis added), discussing Watson

v.

Watson, 144 Idaho 214, 159 P.3d 851 (2007) and Brown

335 P.3d

was

v.

Greenheart, 157 Idaho 156, 168,

13 (2014).

1,

In the case at hand, the commercial transactions were the investments Carter

Gateway Parks

totaling $200,000.

Carter invested funds in

did not do so for a personal or household purpose.

Gateway Parks

to

made

in

make money. He

Carter claimed in the First Lawsuit that the

funds he invested were a “loan” and not an investment. The court in the First Lawsuit concluded
that the funds

were an investment and a commercial

costs t0 Defendants under § 12-120(3).

This

CR at

transaction,

and awarded attorney fees and

121-23.

Second Lawsuit involves the same commercial transactions — Carter’s

investments in Gateway Parks totaling $200,000.

Parks defrauded him by representing that the

In this case, Carter claimed that

ﬁmds involved

in these transactions

used for startup expenses of Gateway Parks and the snow terrain parks. The
that the

two fraud claims were barred by the applicable

barred by resjudicata, and Carter could not establish

As

statutes

all

Gateway

would only be

district court

nine elements of fraud.

is

integral t0 the

commercial transaction between the parties, attorney fees are awardable under Idaho Code
99

Esser Elec.

v.

-

40

§ 12-

Lost River Ballistics Techs., Ina,

145 Idaho 912, 921, 188 P.3d 854, 863 (2008) (emphasis added), (citing Blimka
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held

0f limitation, that his claims were

held by the Idaho Supreme Court, “[W]hen a claim for fraud

120(3) to the prevailing party on that claim.

six

v.

My Web

Wholesaler,

LLC, 143 Idaho 723, 152 P.3d 594 (2007) and Lettunich

v.

Key Bank

Nat’l Ass’n,

141 Idaho 362, 109 P.3d 1104) (2005)).

on the commercial transactions

in

words of the Court, “the relevant inquiry

is

In this case, Carter’s claims for fraud are based entirely

which he invested funds

in

Gateway

Parks.

In the

Whether the commercial transaction constituted the gravamen of the lawsuit, and was the basis

on which a party

The

is

attempting t0 recover.” Garner

fact that the

Povey, 15 1 Idaho

at

commercial transactions were the gravamen 0f

ﬁthher demonstrated by the fact that

any basis

v.

and

t0 claim fraud;

(ii)

(i)

469, 259 P.3d at 615.
this current lawsuit is

Without the commercial transactions, there could not be

Carter sought the return of his $200,000 investment

made

through these commercial transactions as the measure of his damages.

For these reasons, and based on the authority
that the

cited,

Gateway Parks

respectfully requests

Court afﬁrm the award of attorney fees t0 Gateway Parks — as the prevailing party in a

lawsuit in which a commercial transaction

4.

was

the

gravamen of the

Argument That Attorney Fees Cannot Be Recovered Under I.C. § 12Fraud In The Inducement Is A Tort Claim Is Based On
Because
120(3)
Outdated Idaho Case Law That Has Been Overruled.
Carter’s

Carter contends that

Gateway Parks cannot recover attorney

120(3) because his claim for fraud in the inducement

does not apply. This argument

is

is

fees under Idaho

a tort claim and Idaho

Code

Code
§

12-120(3)

§

12-120(3) applies in

a_ll

cases involving a commercial

mifthe stated claim or claims sound in tort.

From time

to time the Court has denied fees under LC. § 12-120(3) 0n the
commercial transaction ground either because the claim sounded in tort 0r
because no contract was involved. The commercial transaction in I.C. § 12120(3) neither prohibits a fee award for a commercial transaction that involves
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§ 12-

based 0n outdated Idaho case law that has been overruled. In

2007, the Idaho Supreme Court held that
transaction

suit.

tortious conduct (see Lettum'ch

v.

Key Bank Nat’l Ass’n

141 Idaho 362, 369, 109

P.3d 1104, 1111(2005)), nor does it require that there be a contract. Any grevious
holdings t0 the contrary are overruled.

Blimka

v.

My Web

(emphasis added).

Wholesaler,

LLC, 143 Idaho 723, 728-29, 152 P.3d 594, 599-600 (2007)

Thus, under Blimka, the three cases relied on by Carter t0 support his

argument were decided before Blimka and have been overruled as

DuPont De Nemours and

C0., 117 Idaho 78,

t0 this issue:

792 P.2d 345 (1990); Brooks

Ina, 128 Idaho 72, 910 P.2d 774 (1996), and McPheters

v.

v.

Brower

v.

E.I

Gigray Ranches,

Maile, 138 Idaho 391, 64 P.3d 317

(2003).

Many
e.g.,

Stevens

other Idaho

v.

Supreme Court cases decided a

Eyer, 161 Idaho 407, 410-41

1,

ter

Blimka

in

2007 are

in accord.

387 P.3d 75, 78-79 (2016) (“IFG responds

See,

that this

Court has already held that allegations 0f tortious conduct do not prohibit fee awards under Idaho

code section 12-120(3). IFG

Computer

Ctr., Inc.

is

correct”) (citing Blimka); Bridge

Tower Dental, P.A.

v.

Meridian

152 Idaho 569, 575, 272 P.3d 541, 547 (2012) (negligence claim arose out 0f

a commercial transaction and therefore attorney fees were properly awarded under LC. § 12120(3)).

In Lettunich

v.

Key Bank Nat’l Ass’n

141 Idaho 362, 369, 109 P.3d 1104, 1111 (2005),

the Court held:

all

of Lettunich’s claims arise within the commercial context 0f Lettunich

attempting t0 obtain a loan for his business.

The fraud claim

is

simply another

aspect 0f Lettunich’s claim that he purchased cattle at the sale as a result 0f

KeyBank’s representations. A11 of this was integral to the commercial transaction
between KeyBank and Lettunich. The district court’s award 0f attorney fees
under LC. § 12-120(3) was proper.
Id. at 369,

109 P.3d

at

1111 (emphasis added).

The case ofMeyers

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF
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v.

Hansen

42

is

also squarely

on

point:

Although Hansen characterized the investment as a personal loan t0 him, Meyers
and her late husband invested nearly $300,000 in Ideal Consultants, what they
believed was a legitimate attempt to build a revenue-generating program known
as the Congressional Accountability Project. This was a fraudulent commercial
transaction and Meyers is entitled t0 attorney fees under LC. § 12-120(3).

Meyers

v.

Hansen, 148 Idaho 283, 292-93, 221 P.3d 81, 90-91 (2009) (emphasis added).

also Bryan Trucking, Inc.

under LC.

v.

Gier, 160 Idaho 422, 374 P.3d 585 (2016) (fees are to be

§ 12-120(3) in cases involving a tort

See

awarded

claim so long as a commercial transaction forms

the basis 0f the claim).

Based on the preceding
LC.

§ 12-120(3)

5.

based on his argument that his fraud claims sound in

tort.

Under Idaho Law, Carter Has Made I.C. § 12-120(3) Applicable t0 this Case By
Pleading A Commercial Transaction and Making A Claim for Attorney Fees
under § 12-120(3)

In

award of attorney fees under

authority, Carter cannot avoid an

Garner

v.

in His Complaint.

Povey, 151 Idaho 462, 259 P.3d 608 (201

1),

that “allegations in the complaint that the parties entered into a

the complaining party

is

entitled t0 recover

May

complaint ﬁled

14,

Supreme Court held

commercial transaction and that

based upon that transaction, are sufﬁcient to trigger

the application 0f1.C. § 12-120(3).” Id. at 470,

In his

the Idaho

259 P.3d 616.

2018, Carter alleged that “misrepresentations and

omissions of Gateway Parks t0 Plaintiffs were representations material t0 Plaintiffs" investment

purchases Ofstock[.]”

and

CR at

10,

ﬂ 10 (emphasis added).

sale 0f the investments constitute an offer t0

(emphasis added).

He

further alleged that

sell,

He

and

alleged that

sale 0f a security.”

-
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Id. at 10,

offer

ﬂ 13

“Gateway Parks offered and sold the investment

equity membership units With the intent t0 defraud Plaintiffs[.]”

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF
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CR

at

11,

1]

for

16 (emphasis

And,

added).

under

Carter speciﬁcally alleged that he

lastly,

CR at

I.C. § 12-120(3).

12,

1]

was

19.

This case arises from a commercial transaction.

commercial transaction.

The gravamen of

the suit

is

the

In his Complaint, Carter expressly pleads the commercial transaction

and makes a claim for fees under

I.C. § 12-120(3).

commercial transaction occurred 0r
at

entitled t0 recover attorney fees

Therefore, Carter cannot

that § 12-120(3) does not apply.

Garner

v.

now

argue that n0

Povey, 15 1 Idaho

470, 259 P.3d at 616.

6.

Common Law Fraud and Fraud Under The Idaho Uniform
Act Are Not Separable For Purposes Of Awarding Attorney Fees.

Carter’s Claims For
Securities

Carter next argues that

§ 12-120(3)

on

which

§

12-120(3) does not apply.

This argument

Code

fees under Idaho

of fraud under the Idaho Uniform Securities Act because

his claim

statutory claim to

Gateway Parks cannot recover attorney

fails for the

it

is

a

following

reasons.

First, the

Idaho Supreme Court has held that “[W]hen various statutory and

common law

claims are separable, a court should bifurcate the claims and award fees pursuant to § 12-120(3)

only 0n the commercial transaction.” Willie

307 (2002). Here, the claims are
law together
fraud claims.

in

n_0t

v.

Bd. ofTrustees, 138 Idaho 131, 136, 59 P.3d 302,

separable.

A11 of the

work done

t0 pull the facts

Gateway Parks’ summary judgment motion and brieﬁng was
This

is

shown

in

Gateway Parks” two summary judgment

the

same

briefs

and case

as to both

which did not

have any separate sections dealing With fraud in the inducement and fraud under the Securities
Act.

A11 aspects 0f the two fraud claims were addressed jointly.

0r citations of legal authority were
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made

that applied t0

N0

separate statement 0f facts

one fraud claim and not the

other.

Thus,

Gateway Parks would have incurred

the exact

same attorney

fees

even

if Carter

only brought the

common law claim.
At most, the amount 0f attorney fees would be reduced by some small amount
for the

one or two sentences in Gateway Parks’ brieﬁng that noted that the

for fraud

under the Idaho Securities Act has a different time frame from

Other than

that, all

the law cited in

t0

of limitations

common law

fraud.

0f the detailed facts supporting the statute 0f limitations argument and

Gateway Parks’ brieﬁng was

Similarly,

statute

to account

exactly the

Gateway Parks” brieﬁng made n0

summary judgment 0n

same

all

of

two fraud claims

as

for both fraud claims.

difference between the

the grounds of res judicata and Carter’s inability to establish

all

elements of a fraud claim. The work done to obtain dismissal on those grounds was identical for

both fraud claims.

N0

time was spent on one fraud claim and not the other.

The claims were

addressed simultaneously in the briefs. Thus, Gateway Parks would have had t0 incur the same
fees if only a

In

common law

fraud in the inducement claim had been pled.

summary, the claims

basis exists for reducing the

statutory claim for fraud

7.

are not separable for purposes of awarding attorney fees

award 0f attorney

fees t0

Gateway Parks because an

The Attorney Fees Incurred By Gateway Parks Were Reasonable.
Gateway Parks

$58,250 was not reasonable. “The calculation of reasonable attorney fees
trial

identical

was made.

Carter next argues that the award of attorney fees t0

0f the

and n0

court.”

Bott

is

in the

amount of

within the discretion

Idaho State Bldg. Authority, 128 Idaho 580, 592, 917 P.2d 737, 749

v.

(1996) (quoted in Lettunich

v.
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-

Lettunz'ch, 145

Idaho 746, 749, 185 P.3d 258, 261 (2008)). Carter

has the burden of showing that the amount 0f the award was an abuse of discretion.

Idaho Agricultural Credit Ass ’n

As

v.

Eastern

Neibaur, 133 Idaho 402, 412, 987 P.2d 3 14, 324 (1999).

held by the Idaho Supreme Court:

determine whether the trial court abused its discretion, we determine
the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion;
whether
(1)
(2) Whether the trial court acted Within the outer boundaries of its discretion and
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the speciﬁc choices available t0
it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise 0f reason.
[t]o

“When awarding

attorney fees, a district court must consider the applicable

and may consider any other factor that the
“Rule 54(e)(3) does not require the district court t0
make speciﬁc ﬁndings in the record, only t0 consider the stated factors in
determining the amount of the fees. When considering the factors, courts need
factors set forth in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3)

court

deems appropriate”

not demonstrate

how

.

.

.

they employed any 0f those factors in reaching an award

amount.”
Lettunich

In

v.

Lettunich, 145 Idaho at 749-50, 185 P.3d at 261-62 (citations omitted).

its

decision 0n attorney fees in this case, the district court expressly stated that

award of attorney fees

is

within the discretion of the

trial court; (ii)

applicable factors 0f I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) in awarding fees; and

(iii)

the court

(i)

the

must consider the

that the court did in fact

consider the factors of Rule 54(6), as well as the nature of the litigation, the amount involved in
the controversy, and the length of time utilized in preparation for the various proceedings in this

case.

Supp.CR

at 58-59.

In an attempt to

meet

and misleading statements
set

its

burden 0f showing an abuse 0f discretion, Carter makes

in his brief

0n appeal. For example, Carter claims he served only

of “simple” discovery. Appellants’ Opening Brief,

discovery, one

was “simple”

at 31.

Carter in fact served

on August 31, 2018 and one 0n February 22, 2019. The claim
is

also misleading.
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false

The scope 0f

M

M

sets

0f

that the discovery

the requests for production alone required the

review and production of
Planet Snowtools,

all

Gateway

ﬁnancial records of

Ryan Neptune

personally,

Neptune

Parks, and Lansing Superparks for several years.

Industries,

The “ﬁnancial

records” included every possible type of personal and business ﬁnancial records, from tax returns
to

bank statements, from expense reports

to accounting records.

Answering Carter’s two

sets

of

discovery took weeks of work by counsel for Gateway Parks and required the individual review

and production of tens of thousands of pages of documents.

The time spent

by
t0

the fact that this

is

in preparing this case for

Second Lawsuit between the

the

review and assimilate

summary judgment was

all

decisions, trial exhibits,

parties.

substantially increased

Counsel for Gateway Parks had

0f the pleadings, discovery, afﬁdavits With exhibits, brieﬁng, court

and 800 pages of

trial transcripts

from the

First Lawsuit.

precisely the sort of duplicative and expensive litigation that Idaho’s law

0n

This

is

res judicata is

intended t0 prevent.

Counsel for Gateway Parks then had

move

for

summary judgment.

summary judgment

for

to establish all elements

of fraud).

Carter ﬁled this suit 0n

Parks was not in a position to

May
move

14, 2018.

for

summary judgment on June

only one month before

develop the strategy and do the work necessary to

Three separate legal grounds for dismissal were presented in

Gateway Parks’ motion

court granted

to

(statute

of limitations, res judicata, and inability

Because of

summary judgment
11,

all

0f the work involved, Gateway

until

March of 2019. The

district

2019, more than a year after the case was ﬁled and

trial.

Carter next argues that $9,875 0f the attorney fees were unnecessary because they were
incurred in counsel’s

work with two
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expert witnesses.

As

a result 0f the

summary judgment

motion, these witnesses were not deposed by Carter and did not testify before the court.
Nonetheless, their

work culminated

in a full Expert

opinions, the bases for the opinions, and

at

all

Witness Report which identiﬁed

work done by them and

all

of their

materials reviewed. See

CR

660-677.

The

district court’s

scheduling order required Gateway Parks to disclose

April 29, 2019. This deadline

came well before

0n June

Gateway Parks had

that

11, 2019.

Until then,

was not necessary

it

for counsel for

the court’s decision granting

Gateway Parks

experts

by

summary judgment

For Carter

t0 prepare for trial.

its

t0

to prepare experts for trial is

now

argue

more 0f an

admission that the case never had any merit than a legitimate attack 0n the work by the experts

and counsel for Gateway Parks.

Based 0n Carter’s
review

CPA
had

all

allegations in this case, the experts retained

0f the ﬁnancial records discussed above. One of the experts, Susan M. Langley,

and a certiﬁed fraud examiner.

t0

be reviewed t0 determine

if

all

this process,

t0

is

a

A11 of the accounting records and supporting documents

any fraud

Neptune Industries had occurred. Counsel
through

by Gateway Parks had

in

for

which was an important

any ﬁnancial

activity

by

Gateway Parks worked

either

Ryan Neptune

0r

closely With the experts

part of preparing the case for

trial.

After reviewing

of the ﬁnancial records, the certiﬁed fraud examiner found n0 evidence 0f fraud of any kind.

See

CR

at

664 (Expert Witness Report,

Carter’s argument that the experts did

at 5).

accounting work and offered no relevant opinions

is

no

baseless.

Carter did not disclose experts in compliance With the district court’s deadline for the

Plaintiffs.

Rather, after Defendant

Gateway Parks disclosed experts on April

29, 2019, Carter

hurriedly ﬁled a pleading with the court the next day (April 30) identifying two experts and

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

-

48

listing subjects

This disclosure was more than 30 days

they might address.

deadline for Carter t0 disclose experts.

much

It

was obvious

late,

well after the

that counsel for Carter did not

spend

time with his experts since he did not disclose any expert opinions, the bases of any

opinions, or any 0f the

work the

experts did.

In his appellate brief, Carter for the ﬁrst time suggests that the expert opinions offered

Gateway Parks might not have been admissible. This
addressed by the

district court.

Therefore,

it

since

it is

LLC v.

was not

raised

below and was not

cannot be raised for the ﬁrst time 0n appeal. “This

Court generally Will not consider an issue that

Company,

issue

is

raised for the ﬁrst time

0n appeal.”

Estate ofStorms, 161 Idaho 683, 685, 390 P.3d 409, 411 (2017).

unknown what

opinions Carter’s experts might have offered at

know What would and would not have been

trial, it is

in the

Watkins

Moreover,

impossible to

admissible by Gateway Parks in response. Certainly,

n0 serious question can be made Whether a certiﬁed fraud examiner would be allowed
whether she found any fraud

by

t0 testify

ﬁnancial records in a case Where a commercial transaction

is

challenged as fraudulent.

The

district court

found that Gateway Parks’ attorney fees of $58,250, including $9,875

working with the experts

in time spent

reasonableness

is

committed

t0 the discretion

appeal absent an abuse of discretion.
Carter

may not

agree with the

the one

who ﬁled

is

have known

that attorney fees could

of repetitive and expensive
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it.

0f the

The

for

suit is

The

were reasonable.

district court

Carter has not

work counsel

Lawsuit, he

sort

t0 prepare for trial,

and will not be disturbed on

shown any abuse 0f

Gateway Parks did

issue of

t0

discretion.

defend against

this

While
Second

based 0n a commercial transaction, and he must

be awarded. Moreover,

this

Second Lawsuit

litigation that res judicata is intended to prevent.

is

precisely the

Based on the foregoing, Gateway Parks respectfully requests the

district court’s

award 0f

attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(3) be afﬁrmed.

Gateway Parks Should Be Awarded

E.

Its

And Attorney Fees On Appeal.

Costs

Idaho Appellate Rule 41 requires Gateway Parks t0
attorney fees

on appeal, and

to state the basis for the claim.

Idaho 364, 369, 79 P.3d 723, 728 (2003).
decided in this appeal in
If the

its

make

a speciﬁc claim for costs and

See, e.g.,

Bream

Gateway Parks has identiﬁed

Statement 0f Issues on Appeal, Section

Court rules in favor of Gateway Parks,

it is

II.

Benscoter, 129

v.

this as

an issue to be

above.

entitled t0 recover

its

costs

0n appeal

under Idaho Appellate Rule 40. Rule 40 authorizes the taxation of costs to the prevailing party

0n appeal and identiﬁes the

costs that

may be recovered.

Idaho Appellate Rule 41 provides that a party

may

seek attorney fees on appeal but does

not provide a statutory 0r other legal basis for the recovery 0f attorney fees. Bream, at 369, 79

P.3d

at 728.

Accordingly, Gateway Parks makes

120(3) and bases

its

its

claim for attorney fees under LC.

§

12-

claim 0n the reasoning and authority set forth in this brief in Section IV.D.

above.

V.

For the reasons

set forth above,

respectfully requests that the Court
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deny

CONCLUSION
and based 0n the legal authority
this

cited,

Gateway Parks

appeal and afﬁrm the rulings of the district court.

Respectfully Submitted this 25th day of March, 2020.
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"EXHIBIT

EXHIBIT

1

656
you were using Dropbox instead of email to communicate

with potential investors?
Yeah.

A.

access,
\OMQGWIBLIJNH

This is the easiest way for them to

if they have any questions or concerns,

it was

really important to me they have the ability to snapshot
at any given time and backup.

them,

I

If

I'm saying something to

want them to be able to go back and research it

themselves to know that I'm not doing anything improper.
The point was to be as transparent as humanly possible.
Id C)

Q.

A minute ago when we were looking at the texts

k: IA

you talk about 512, but we skipped 513 —— remember they

kl L)

go in reverse order —— let's me direct your attention to

kl (n

513 of Exhibit 101 for a minute.

PI

We previously talk about the emails you shared

.b

k1 UI

with him on the 26th after you met.

kl ox

any indication after he reviewed them of whether or not

kl

he was still interested in investing?

14

ha a3

A.

Yes.

He responded,

ha \o

email on the 26th, he said,

h) c:

emails,

L) IA

after
"I

Did he give you

I

had sent him the

checked the earlier

I'll check the latest one."

And then the next morning at 9:00 a.m., he said
"I've looked through all the emails and

ha h)

on CARTER 513,

h) Lu

most of the spreadsheets.

h: uh

do some great things.

h) UI

standpoint was if

I

I

think you are positioned to

My thinking from an investment

could help you get one or more

